Rank aggregation methods for the Web
Proceedings of the 10th international conference on World Wide Web
Complexity of manipulating elections with few candidates
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
Vote elicitation: complexity and strategy-proofness
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
How many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate?
Proceedings of the 9th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Universal voting protocol tweaks to make manipulation hard
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
Small coalitions cannot manipulate voting
FC'05 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Anyone but him: The complexity of precluding an alternative
Artificial Intelligence
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 3
A Short Introduction to Computational Social Choice
SOFSEM '07 Proceedings of the 33rd conference on Current Trends in Theory and Practice of Computer Science
Copeland Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control
AAIM '08 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic Aspects in Information and Management
Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem
Artificial Intelligence
Parameterized computational complexity of control problems in voting systems
Theoretical Computer Science
On distance rationalizability of some voting rules
Proceedings of the 12th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge
Proceedings of the 12th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge
Llull and copeland voting broadly resist bribery and control
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Approximability of manipulating elections
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Hybrid elections broaden complexity-theoretic resistance to control
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Parameterized complexity of candidate control in elections and related digraph problems
Theoretical Computer Science
Llull and Copeland voting computationally resist bribery and constructive control
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
How hard is bribery in elections?
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Multimode control attacks on elections
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
The Cost of Stability in Coalitional Games
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
How to change a group's collective decision?
IJCAI'13 Proceedings of the Twenty-Third international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence
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We study the complexity of influencing elections through bribery: How computationally complex is it for an external actor to determine whether by a certain amount of bribing voters a specified candidate can be made the election's winner? We study this problem for election systems as varied as scoring protocols and Dodgson voting, and in a variety of settings regarding homogeneous-vs.-nonhomogeneous electorate bribability, bounded-size-vs.-arbitrary-sized candidate sets, weighted-vs.-unweighted voters, and succinct-vs.-nonsuccinct input specification. We obtain both polynomial-time bribery algorithms and proofs of the intractability of bribery, and indeed our results show that the complexity of bribery is extremely sensitive to the setting. For example, we find settings in which bribery is NP-complete but manipulation (by voters) is in P, and we find settings in which bribing weighted voters is NP-complete but bribing voters with individual bribe thresholds is in P. For the broad class of elections (including plurality, Borda, k-approval, and veto) known as scoring protocols, we prove a dichotomy result for bribery of weighted voters: We find a simple-to-evaluate condition that classifies every case as either NP-complete or in P.