Generalized scoring rules and the frequency of coalitional manipulability
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
The complexity of bribery in elections
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Preference functions that score rankings and maximum likelihood estimation
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
On the role of distances in defining voting rules
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Aggregating preferences in multi-issue domains by using maximum likelihood estimators
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Multimode control attacks on elections
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Homogeneity and monotonicity of distance-rationalizable voting rules
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
On the approximability of Dodgson and Young elections
Artificial Intelligence
Optimal social choice functions: a utilitarian view
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Strategyproof approximations of distance rationalizable voting rules
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
When do noisy votes reveal the truth?
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
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The concept of distance rationalizability has several applications within social choice. In the context of voting, it allows one to define ("rationalize") voting rules via a consensus class (roughly, a set of elections in which it is obvious who should win) and a distance function: namely, a candidate is said to be an election winner if it is ranked first in one of the nearest (with respect to the given distance) consensus elections. It is known that many classic voting rules can be represented in this manner. In this paper, we provide new results on distance rationalizability of several well-known voting rules such as all scoring rules, Approval, Young's rule and Maximin. We also show that a previously published proof of distance rationalizability of Young's rule is incorrect: the consensus notion and the distance function used in that proof give rise to a voting rule that is similar to---but distinct from---the Young's rule. Finally, we demonstrate that some voting rules cannot be rationalized via certain notions of consensus. To the best of our knowledge, these are the first non-distance-rationalizability results for voting rules.