A heuristic technique for multi-agent planning
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Proceedings of the thirty-ninth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Aggregating inconsistent information: Ranking and clustering
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
On the approximability of Dodgson and Young elections
SODA '09 Proceedings of the twentieth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
On distance rationalizability of some voting rules
Proceedings of the 12th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge
Preference functions that score rankings and maximum likelihood estimation
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Ordering by weighted number of wins gives a good ranking for weighted tournaments
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
Socially desirable approximations for Dodgson's voting rule
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
On the role of distances in defining voting rules
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Aggregating preferences in multi-issue domains by using maximum likelihood estimators
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Strategyproof approximations of distance rationalizable voting rules
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
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Distance rationalizability is a framework for classifying voting rules by interpreting them in terms of distances and consensus classes. It can also be used to design new voting rules with desired properties. A particularly natural and versatile class of distances that can be used for this purpose is that of votewise distances [12], which "lift" distances over individual votes to distances over entire elections using a suitable norm. In this paper, we continue the investigation of the properties of votewise distance-rationalizable rules initiated in [12]. We describe a number of general conditions on distances and consensus classes that ensure that the resulting voting rule is homogeneous or monotone. This complements the results of 12], where the authors focus on anonymity, neutrality and consistency. We also introduce a new class of voting rules, that can be viewed as "majority variants" of classic scoring rules, and have a natural interpretation in the context of distance rationalizability.