Probabilistic computations: Toward a unified measure of complexity
SFCS '77 Proceedings of the 18th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Elections Can be Manipulated Often
FOCS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
On distance rationalizability of some voting rules
Proceedings of the 12th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge
Nonexistence of voting rules that are usually hard to manipulate
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Universal voting protocol tweaks to make manipulation hard
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
On the role of distances in defining voting rules
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Homogeneity and monotonicity of distance-rationalizable voting rules
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Hybrid voting protocols and hardness of manipulation
ISAAC'05 Proceedings of the 16th international conference on Algorithms and Computation
Approximately strategy-proof voting
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
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This paper considers randomized strategyproof approximations to distance rationalizable voting rules. It is shown that the Random Dictator voting rule (return the top choice of a random voter) nontrivially approximates a large class of distances with respect to unanimity. Any randomized voting rule that deviates too greatly from the Random Dictator voting rule is shown to obtain a trivial approximation (i.e., equivalent to ignoring the voters' votes and selecting an alternative uniformly at random). The outlook for consensus classes, other than unanimity is bleaker. This paper shows that for a large number of distance rationalizations, with respect to the majority and Condorcet consensus classes that no strategyproof randomized rule can asymptotically outperform uniform random selection of an alternative. This paper also shows that veto cannot be approximated nontrivially when approximations are measured with respect to minimizing the number of vetoes an alternative receives.