Sorting on Electronic Computer Systems
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Mechanism Design via Differential Privacy
FOCS '07 Proceedings of the 48th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
The influence of variables on Boolean functions
SFCS '88 Proceedings of the 29th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Elections Can be Manipulated Often
FOCS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Nonexistence of voting rules that are usually hard to manipulate
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
The Geometry of Manipulation: A Quantitative Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
FOCS '10 Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE 51st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Calibrating noise to sensitivity in private data analysis
TCC'06 Proceedings of the Third conference on Theory of Cryptography
Computational social choice: the first four centuries
XRDS: Crossroads, The ACM Magazine for Students - Computer Science in Service of Democracy
Strategyproof approximations of distance rationalizable voting rules
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Bayesian mechanism design with efficiency, privacy, and approximate truthfulness
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Triadic consensus: a randomized algorithm for voting in a crowd
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
The complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single-peaked electorates
Artificial Intelligence
Bribery in voting with CP-nets
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
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The classic Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem establishes that only dictatorial voting rules are strategy-proof; under any other voting rule, players have an incentive to lie about their true preferences. We consider a new approach for circumventing this result: we consider randomized voting rules that only approximate a deterministic voting rule and only are approximately strategy-proof. We show that any deterministic voting rule can be approximated by an approximately strategy-proof randomized voting rule, and we provide asymptotically tight lower bounds on the parameters required by such voting rules.