Strategy-proof voting rules over multi-issue domains with restricted preferences
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Multimode control attacks on elections
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Ties matter: complexity of voting manipulation revisited
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
An algorithm for the coalitional manipulation problem under Maximin
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Computational social choice: the first four centuries
XRDS: Crossroads, The ACM Magazine for Students - Computer Science in Service of Democracy
Where are the hard manipulation problems?
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Approximately strategy-proof voting
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
Group-strategyproof irresolute social choice functions
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
Ties matter: complexity of voting manipulation revisited
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume Three
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
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We prove a quantitative version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. We show that a uniformly chosen voter profile for a neutral social choice function $f$ of $q \geq 4$ alternatives and $n$ voters will be manipulable with probability at least $10^{-4} \eps^2 n^{-3} q^{-30}$, where $\eps$ is the minimal statistical distance between $f$ and the family of dictator functions. Our results extend those of Fried gut et al, which were obtained for the case of $3$ alternatives, and imply that the approach of masking manipulations behind computational hardness cannot hide manipulations completely. Our proof is geometric. More specifically it extends the method of canonical paths to show that the measure of the profiles that lie on the interface of $3$ or more outcomes is large. To the best of our knowledge our result is the first isoperimetric result to establish interface of more than two bodies.