Nonexistence of voting rules that are usually hard to manipulate
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Where are the really hard manipulation problems? the phase transition in manipulating the veto rule
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
The Geometry of Manipulation: A Quantitative Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
FOCS '10 Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE 51st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Necessary and sufficient conditions for the strategyproofness of irresolute social choice functions
Proceedings of the 13th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge
On the tradeoff between economic efficiency and strategy proofness in randomized social choice
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
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An important problem in voting is that agents may misrepresent their preferences in order to obtain a more preferred outcome. Unfortunately, this phenomenon has been shown to be inevitable in the case of resolute, i.e., single-valued, social choice functions. In this paper, we introduce a variant of Maskin-monotonicity that completely characterizes the class of pairwise irresolute social choice functions that are group-strategyproof according to Kelly's preference extension. The class is narrow but contains a number of appealing Condorcet extensions such as the minimal covering set and the bipartisan set, thereby answering a question raised independently by Barberà (1977) and Kelly (1977). These functions furthermore encourage participation and thus do not suffer from the no-show paradox (under Kelly's extension).