Randomized algorithms
Vote elicitation: complexity and strategy-proofness
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
Communication complexity of common voting rules
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Single-peaked consistency and its complexity
Proceedings of the 2008 conference on ECAI 2008: 18th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Nonexistence of voting rules that are usually hard to manipulate
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Eliciting single-peaked preferences using comparison queries
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Approximately strategy-proof voting
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
Robust approximation and incremental elicitation in voting protocols
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
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Typical voting rules do not work well in settings with many candidates. If there are even several hundred candidates, then a simple task such as evaluating and choosing a top candidate becomes impractical. Motivated by the hope of developing group consensus mechanisms over the internet, where the numbers of candidates could easily number in the thousands, we study an urn-based voting rule where each participant acts as a voter and a candidate. We prove that when participants lie in a one-dimensional space, this voting protocol finds a $(1-\epsilon/\sqrt{n})$ approximation of the Condorcet winner with high probability while only requiring an expected $O(\frac{1}{\epsilon^2}\log^2 \frac{n}{\epsilon^2})$ comparisons on average per voter. Moreover, this voting protocol is shown to have a quasi-truthful Nash equilibrium: namely, a Nash equilibrium exists which may not be truthful, but produces a winner with the same probability distribution as that of the truthful strategy.