On the approximability of Dodgson and Young elections

  • Authors:

  • Ioannis Caragiannis;Jason A. Covey;Michal Feldman;Christopher M. Homan;Christos Kaklamanis;Nikos Karanikolas;Ariel D. Procaccia;Jeffrey S. Rosenschein

  • Affiliations:

  • Computer Technology Institute and Department of Computer Engineering and Informatics, University of Patras, 26504 Rio, Greece;Department of Computer Science, Rochester Institute of Technology, 102 Lomb Memorial Drive, Rochester, NY 14623-5603, USA;School of Business Administration and Center for the Study of Rationality, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem 91904, Israel and Microsoft Israel R&D Center, Israel;Department of Computer Science, Rochester Institute of Technology, 102 Lomb Memorial Drive, Rochester, NY 14623-5603, USA;Computer Technology Institute and Department of Computer Engineering and Informatics, University of Patras, 26504 Rio, Greece;Computer Technology Institute and Department of Computer Engineering and Informatics, University of Patras, 26504 Rio, Greece;School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA;School of Computer Science and Engineering, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem 91904, Israel

  • Venue:
  • Artificial Intelligence
  • Year:
  • 2012

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Abstract

The voting rules proposed by Dodgson and Young are both designed to find an alternative closest to being a Condorcet winner, according to two different notions of proximity; the score of a given alternative is known to be hard to compute under either rule. In this paper, we put forward two algorithms for approximating the Dodgson score: a combinatorial, greedy algorithm and an LP-based algorithm, both of which yield an approximation ratio of H"m"-"1, where m is the number of alternatives and H"m"-"1 is the (m-1)st harmonic number. We also prove that our algorithms are optimal within a factor of 2, unless problems in NP have quasi-polynomial-time algorithms. Despite the intuitive appeal of the greedy algorithm, we argue that the LP-based algorithm has an advantage from a social choice point of view. Further, we demonstrate that computing any reasonable approximation of the ranking produced by Dodgson@?s rule is NP-hard. This result provides a complexity-theoretic explanation of sharp discrepancies that have been observed in the social choice theory literature when comparing Dodgson elections with simpler voting rules. Finally, we show that the problem of calculating the Young score is NP-hard to approximate by any factor. This leads to an inapproximability result for the Young ranking.