Fully proportional representation as resource allocation: approximability results

Authors:
Piotr Skowron;Piotr Faliszewski;Arkadii Slinko
Affiliations:
University of Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland;AGH University, Krakow, Poland;University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand
Venue:
IJCAI'13 Proceedings of the Twenty-Third international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence
Year:
2013

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Abstract

We study the complexity of (approximate) winner determination under Monroe's and Chamberlin-Courant's multiwinner voting rules, where we focus on the total (dis)satisfaction of the voters (the utilitarian case) or the (dis)satisfaction of the worst-off voter (the egalitarian case). We show good approximation algorithms for the satisfaction-based utilitarian cases, and inapproximability results for the remaining settings.