Anyone but him: The complexity of precluding an alternative
Artificial Intelligence
On the robustness of preference aggregation in noisy environments
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
How hard is bribery in elections?
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Computing the margin of victory for various voting rules
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
How hard is it to control an election?
Mathematical and Computer Modelling: An International Journal
Multivariate Complexity Analysis of Swap Bribery
Algorithmica - Special Issue: Parameterized and Exact Computation, Part I
Fully proportional representation as resource allocation: approximability results
IJCAI'13 Proceedings of the Twenty-Third international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence
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We study the sensitivity of election outcomes to small changes in voters' preferences. We assume that a voter may err by swapping two adjacent candidates in his vote; we would like to check whether the election outcome would remain the same given up to delta errors. We show that this problem can be viewed as the destructive version of the unit-cost swap bribery problem, and demonstrate that it is polynomial-time solvable for all scoring rules as well as for the Condorcet rule. We are also interested in identifying elections that are maximally robust with respect to a given voting rule. We define the robustness radius of an election with respect to a given voting rule as the maximum number of errors that can be made without changing the election outcome; the robustness of a voting rule is defined as the robustness radius of the election that is maximally robust with respect to this rule. We derive bounds on the robustness of various voting rules, including Plurality, Borda, and Condorcet.