The complexity of deciding reachability properties of distributed negotiation schemes
Theoretical Computer Science
Distributed multiagent resource allocation in diminishing marginal return domains
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Pure Nash equilibria in player-specific and weighted congestion games
Theoretical Computer Science
Negotiating socially optimal allocations of resources
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Reaching envy-free states in distributed negotiation settings
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
The complexity of contract negotiation
Artificial Intelligence
Simple negotiation schemes for agents with simple preferences: sufficiency, necessity and maximality
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Fully proportional representation as resource allocation: approximability results
IJCAI'13 Proceedings of the Twenty-Third international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence
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We study a particular multiagent resource allocation problem with indivisible, but sharable resources. In our model, the utility of an agent for using a bundle of resources is the difference between the valuation of that bundle and a congestion cost (or delay), a figure formed by adding up the individual congestion costs of each resource in the bundle. The valuation and the delay can be agent-dependent. When the agents that share a resource also share the resource's control, the current users of a resource will require some compensation when a new agent wants to use the resource. We study the existence of distributed protocols that lead to a social optimum. Depending on constraints on the valuation functions (mainly modularity), on the delay functions (e.g., convexity), and the structural complexity of the deals between agents, we prove either the existence of some sequences of deals or the convergence of all sequences of deals to a social optimum. When the agents do not have joint control over the resources (i.e., they can use any resource they want), we study the existence of pure Nash equilibria. We provide results for modular valuation functions and relate them to results from the literature on congestion games.