Reaching envy-free states in distributed negotiation settings

Authors:
Yann Chevaleyre;Ulle Endriss;Sylvia Estivie;Nicolas Maudet
Affiliations:
LAMSADE, Univ. Paris-Dauphine, France;ILLC, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands;LAMSADE, Univ. Paris-Dauphine, France;LAMSADE, Univ. Paris-Dauphine, France
Venue:
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Year:
2007

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Abstract

Mechanisms for dividing a set of goods amongst a number of autonomous agents need to balance efficiency and fairness requirements. A common interpretation of fairness is envy-freeness, while efficiency is usually understood as yielding maximal overall utility. We show how to set up a distributed negotiation framework that will allow a group of agents to reach an allocation of goods that is both efficient and envy-free.