Efficiency and envy-freeness in fair division of indivisible goods

  • Authors:
  • Sylvain Bouveret;Jérôme Lang

  • Affiliations:
  • IRIT, UPS, CNRS and ONERA, Toulouse Cedex 4, France;IRIT, Université Paul Sabatier, CNRS, Toulouse Cedex, France

  • Venue:
  • IJCAI'05 Proceedings of the 19th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
  • Year:
  • 2005

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Abstract

We study fair division of indivisible goods among agents from the point of view of compact representation and computational complexity. We identify the complexity of several problems, including that of deciding whether there exists an efficient and envy-free allocation when preferences are represented in a succinct way. We also draw connections to nonmonotonic reasoning.