Distributed rational decision making
Multiagent systems
Strategic negotiation in multiagent environments
Strategic negotiation in multiagent environments
Games That Agents Play: A Formal Framework for Dialogues between Autonomous Agents
Journal of Logic, Language and Information
Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Theory and Practice
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Some Tractable Combinatorial Auctions
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Dialogue Frames in Agent Communication
ICMAS '98 Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Multi Agent Systems
Advances in Agent Communication: International Workshop on Agent Communication Languages, Acl 2003, Melbourne, Australia, July 14, 2003: Revised and Invited Papers (Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2922.)
On the Communication Complexity of Multilateral Trading
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Extremal behaviour in multiagent contract negotiation
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Efficiency and envy-freeness in fair division of indivisible goods
IJCAI'05 Proceedings of the 19th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
The complexity of contract negotiation
Artificial Intelligence
Complexity of social welfare optimization in multiagent resource allocation
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
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In studies of settings concerning the allocation of a finite resource collection among a set of agents it is, usually, assumed that each agent associates a value with each subset of resources via a utility function that is free from so-called externalities, i.e. that these values are independent of the distribution of the remaining resources among the other agents. While this assumption is valid in many application domains, it is, however, by no means universally so. Thus, one can identify a number of circumstances wherein an agent's assessment of a given subset is dependent not only on the elements of this set but also on the context in which it is held, i.e. on the resources owned by other agents. In this paper a general model for considering resource allocation settings with externalities is presented and its properties reviewed with reference to a select number of issues that have been widely-studied in externality–free settings.