Exploiting a Common Property Resource under a Fairness Constraint: a Case Study
IJCAI '99 Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
On approximately fair allocations of indivisible goods
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Logical Preference Representation and Combinatorial Vote
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Combinatorial Auctions
Efficiency and envy-freeness in fair division of indivisible goods
IJCAI'05 Proceedings of the 19th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
How equitable is rational negotiation?
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Infinitesimal nash transfers for resource allocation in strong social alliances
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Logic-based automated multi-issue bilateral negotiation in peer-to-peer e-marketplaces
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
A Short Introduction to Computational Social Choice
SOFSEM '07 Proceedings of the 33rd conference on Current Trends in Theory and Practice of Computer Science
Fuzzy Bilateral Matchmaking in e-Marketplaces
KES '08 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Knowledge-Based Intelligent Information and Engineering Systems, Part III
Computing leximin-optimal solutions in constraint networks
Artificial Intelligence
Description logics for multi-issue bilateral negotiation with incomplete information
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
WI-IAT '09 Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Joint Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology - Volume 02
Efficiency and envy-freeness in fair division of indivisible goods
IJCAI'05 Proceedings of the 19th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
Alternating-offers protocol for multi-issue bilateral negotiation in semantic-enabled marketplaces
ISWC'07/ASWC'07 Proceedings of the 6th international The semantic web and 2nd Asian conference on Asian semantic web conference
OWL-DL as a power tool to model negotiation mechanisms with incomplete information
ISWC'07/ASWC'07 Proceedings of the 6th international The semantic web and 2nd Asian conference on Asian semantic web conference
Extending propositional logic with concrete domains for multi-issue bilateral negotiation
DALT'07 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Declarative agent languages and technologies V
Towards a fuzzy logic for automated multi-issue negotiation
FoIKS'08 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Foundations of information and knowledge systems
A general branch-and-bound algorithm for fair division problems
Computers and Operations Research
Compactly representing utility functions using weighted goals and the max aggregator
Artificial Intelligence
LP Solvable Models for Multiagent Fair Allocation Problems
Proceedings of the 2010 conference on ECAI 2010: 19th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Some representation and computational issues in social choice
ECSQARU'05 Proceedings of the 8th European conference on Symbolic and Quantitative Approaches to Reasoning with Uncertainty
Egalitarian allocations of indivisible resources: theory and computation
CIA'06 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Cooperative Information Agents
Decomposing combinatorial auctions and set packing problems
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Hi-index | 0.00 |
Many industrial or research activities are so expensive that it is often benefitable for the involved agents to cofund the construction or the purchase of a common required resource. This resource will then be exploited in common, therefore in a shared way. The rules for resource sharing should take account of the possibly antagonistic preferences: each agent wants to maximize its own satisfaction, whereas, from the collective point of view, decisions which both are equitable and exploit the resource in an optimal way are looked for. We give in this article a formal model for indivisible goods resource sharing without monetary compensations and with arbitrary feasability constraints. We also give some complexity results about this model. The model is applied to a real-world case, namely satellite resource sharing.