Terminological reasoning is inherently intractable (research note)
Artificial Intelligence
Strategic negotiation in multiagent environments
Strategic negotiation in multiagent environments
Allocation of indivisible goods: a general model and some complexity results
Proceedings of the fourth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
The Description Logic Handbook
The Description Logic Handbook
A logic-based framework to compute Pareto agreements in one-shot bilateral negotiation
Proceedings of the 2006 conference on ECAI 2006: 17th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence August 29 -- September 1, 2006, Riva del Garda, Italy
A computational model of logic-based negotiation
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Weighted Description Logics Preference Formulas for Multiattribute Negotiation
SUM '09 Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Scalable Uncertainty Management
WI-IAT '09 Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Joint Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology - Volume 02
Alternating-offers protocol for multi-issue bilateral negotiation in semantic-enabled marketplaces
ISWC'07/ASWC'07 Proceedings of the 6th international The semantic web and 2nd Asian conference on Asian semantic web conference
OWL-DL as a power tool to model negotiation mechanisms with incomplete information
ISWC'07/ASWC'07 Proceedings of the 6th international The semantic web and 2nd Asian conference on Asian semantic web conference
Computing utility from weighted description logic preference formulas
DALT'09 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Declarative Agent Languages and Technologies
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We propose a framework for multi-issue bilateral negotiation, where issues are expressed and related to each other via Description Logics. Agents' goals are expressed through (complex) concepts, and the worth of goals as weights over concepts. We adopt a very general setting with incomplete information by letting agents keep both goals and worths of goals as private information. We introduce a negotiation protocol for such a setting, and discuss different possible strategies that agents can adopt during the negotiation process. We show that such a protocol converges, if the Description Logic used enjoys the finite implicants property.