Strategic negotiation in multiagent environments
Strategic negotiation in multiagent environments
Spinning the Semantic Web: Bringing the World Wide Web to Its Full Potential
Spinning the Semantic Web: Bringing the World Wide Web to Its Full Potential
Optimal agendas for multi-issue negotiation
AAMAS '03 Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
TARK '01 Proceedings of the 8th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Allocation of indivisible goods: a general model and some complexity results
Proceedings of the fourth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Where Are All the Intelligent Agents?
IEEE Intelligent Systems
Tractable Reasoning and Efficient Query Answering in Description Logics: The DL-Lite Family
Journal of Automated Reasoning
Compact preference representation and Boolean games
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
A computational model of logic-based negotiation
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Description logics for multi-issue bilateral negotiation with incomplete information
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Alternating-offers protocol for multi-issue bilateral negotiation in semantic-enabled marketplaces
ISWC'07/ASWC'07 Proceedings of the 6th international The semantic web and 2nd Asian conference on Asian semantic web conference
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Multi-attribute negotiation has been extensively studied from a game-theoretic viewpoint. In negotiation settings, utility functions are used to express agent preferences. Normal and extensive form games, however, have the drawback of requiring an explicit representation of utility functions, listing the utility values for all combinations of strategies. Therefore, several logical preference languages have been proposed, to specify multi-attribute utility functions in a compact way. Among these approaches, there are also Boolean games. In this paper, we introduce Boolean description logic games, which are a combination of Boolean games with ontological background knowledge, formulated using expressive description logics. In this way, it is possible to enhance the expressiveness of preference representation, maintaining the advantages of the game-theoretic approach. We include and discuss several generalizations, showing their practical usefulness within a service negotiation scenario. Furthermore, we also provide complexity results.