A computational model of logic-based negotiation

  • Authors:
  • Dongmo Zhang;Yan Zhang

  • Affiliations:
  • Intelligent Systems Laboratory, School of Computing and Mathematics, University of Western Sydney, Australia;Intelligent Systems Laboratory, School of Computing and Mathematics, University of Western Sydney, Australia

  • Venue:
  • AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
  • Year:
  • 2006

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Abstract

This paper presents a computational model of negotiation based on Nebel's syntax-based belief revision. The model guarantees a unique bargaining solution for each bargaining game without using lotteries. Its game-theoretic properties are discussed against the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium. We also study essential computational properties in relation to our negotiation model. In particular, we show that the deal membership checking is DP-complete and the corresponding agreement inference problem is Π2P-hard.