Reaching agreements through argumentation: a logical model and implementation
Artificial Intelligence
A Framework for Argumentation-Based Negotiation
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Negotiation as mutual belief revision
AAAI'04 Proceedings of the 19th national conference on Artifical intelligence
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AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
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AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
An ordinal bargaining solution with fixed-point property
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A logic-based axiomatic model of bargaining
Artificial Intelligence
Logical properties of belief-revision-based bargaining solution
AI'06 Proceedings of the 19th Australian joint conference on Artificial Intelligence: advances in Artificial Intelligence
A scheduling problem with one producer and the bargaining counterpart with two producers
ESCAPE'07 Proceedings of the First international conference on Combinatorics, Algorithms, Probabilistic and Experimental Methodologies
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Journal of Combinatorial Optimization
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This paper presents a logical extension of Nash's Cooperative Bargaining Theory. We introduce a concept of entrenchment measurement, which maps propositions to real numbers, as a vehicle to represent agent's belief states and attitudes towards bargaining situations. We show that Nash's bargaining solution can be restated in terms of bargainers belief states. Negotiable items, bargaining outcomes and conflicting arguments can then be explicitly expressed in propositional logic meanwhile Nash's numerical solution to bargaining problem is still applicable.