Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions
Management Science
Bilateral Trade and `Small-World' Networks
Computational Economics
The Distributed Constraint Satisfaction Problem: Formalization and Algorithms
IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering
On approximately fair allocations of indivisible goods
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
The complexity of contract negotiation
Artificial Intelligence
Negotiating socially optimal allocations of resources
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Reaching envy-free states in distributed negotiation settings
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Efficiency and envy-freeness in fair division of indivisible goods
IJCAI'05 Proceedings of the 19th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
Resource allocation in communication networks using abstraction and constraint satisfaction
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Trajectories of goods in distributed allocation
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
On Low-Envy Truthful Allocations
ADT '09 Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory
Fair Division under Ordinal Preferences: Computing Envy-Free Allocations of Indivisible Goods
Proceedings of the 2010 conference on ECAI 2010: 19th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Multiagent task allocation in social networks
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
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We introduce a distributed negotiation framework for multi-agent resource allocation where interactions between agents are limited by a graph defining a negotiation topology. A group of agents may only contract a deal if that group is fully connected according to the negotiation topology. An important criterion for assessing the quality of an allocation of resources, in terms of fairness, is envy-freeness: an agent is said to envy another agent if it would prefer to swap places with that other agent. We analyse under what circumstances a sequence of deals respecting the negotiation topology may be expected to converge to a state where no agent envies any of the agents it is directly connected to. We also analyse the computational complexity of a related decision problem, namely the problem of checking whether a given negotiation state admits any deal that would both be beneficial to every agent involved and reduce envy in the agent society.