On complexity of single-minded auction
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
On profit-maximizing envy-free pricing
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Combinatorial Auctions
Item pricing for revenue maximization
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Uniform Budgets and the Envy-Free Pricing Problem
ICALP '08 Proceedings of the 35th international colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming, Part I
Settling the complexity of computing two-player Nash equilibria
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Complexity results about Nash equilibria
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
Efficiency and envy-freeness in fair division of indivisible goods
IJCAI'05 Proceedings of the 19th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
The Complexity of Computing a Nash Equilibrium
SIAM Journal on Computing
Optimal Envy-Free Pricing with Metric Substitutability
SIAM Journal on Computing
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In a centralized combinatorial market, the market maker has a number of items for sale to potential consumers, who wish to purchase their preferred items. Different solution concepts (allocations of items to players) capture different perspectives in the market. Our focus is to balance three properties: revenue maximization from the market maker's perspective, fairness from consumers' perspective, and efficiency from the market's global perspective. Most well-known solution concepts capture only one or two properties, e.g., Walrasian equilibrium requires fairness for consumers and uses market clearance to guarantee efficiency but ignores revenue for the market maker. Revenue maximizing envy-free pricing balances market maker's revenue and consumer's fairness, but ignores efficiency. In this paper, we study a solution concept, envy-free Pareto efficient pricing, that lies between Walrasian equilibrium and envy-free pricing. It requires fairness for consumers and balances efficiency and revenue. We study envy-free Pareto efficient pricing in two domains, unit-demand and single-minded consumers, and analyze its existence, computation, and economic properties.