Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Anyone but him: The complexity of precluding an alternative
Artificial Intelligence
A sufficient condition for voting rules to be frequently manipulable
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Generalized scoring rules and the frequency of coalitional manipulability
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Elections Can be Manipulated Often
FOCS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Nonexistence of voting rules that are usually hard to manipulate
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
The complexity of bribery in elections
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Manipulating the quota in weighted voting games
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Complexity of strategic behavior in multi-winner elections
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Hybrid elections broaden complexity-theoretic resistance to control
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Parameterized complexity of control problems in Maximin election
Information Processing Letters
The complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single-peaked electorates
Proceedings of the 13th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge
Multimode control attacks on elections
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Possible winners when new alternatives join: new results coming up!
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
An algorithm for the coalitional manipulation problem under Maximin
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Is computational complexity a barrier to manipulation?
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
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In 1992, Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [1992] opened the study of control attacks on elections--attempts to improve the election outcome by such actions as adding/deleting candidates or voters. That work has led to many results on how algorithms can be used to find attacks on elections and how complexity-theoretic hardness results can be used as shields against attacks. However, all the work in this line has assumed that the attacker employs just a single type of attack. In this paper, we model and study the case in which the attacker launches a multipronged (i.e., multimode) attack. We do so to more realistically capture the richness of reallife settings. For example, an attacker might simultaneously try to suppress some voters, attract new voters into the election, and introduce a spoiler candidate. Our model provides a unified framework for such varied attacks, and by constructing polynomial-time multiprong attack algorithms we prove that for various election systems even such concerted, flexible attacks can be perfectly planned in deterministic polynomial time.