Election manipulation: the average case

Authors:
Elchanan Mossel;Miklós Z. Rácz
Affiliations:
University of California, Berkeley;University of California, Berkeley
Venue:
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Year:
2012

Citing 6
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Abstract

We review recent research on quantitative versions of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, which analyze the average-case manipulability of elections. The main message of these results is that computational hardness cannot hide manipulations completely. We conclude with open problems.