Voting for movies: the anatomy of a recommender system
Proceedings of the third annual conference on Autonomous Agents
Rank aggregation methods for the Web
Proceedings of the 10th international conference on World Wide Web
Generalized scoring rules and the frequency of coalitional manipulability
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
The learnability of voting rules
Artificial Intelligence
The strategy-proofness landscape of merging
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Compiling the votes of a subelectorate
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Finite local consistency characterizes generalized scoring rules
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
The Clarke tax as a consensus mechanism among automated agents
AAAI'91 Proceedings of the ninth National conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Computing the margin of victory for various voting rules
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Election manipulation: the average case
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
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Generalized scoring rules [Xia and Conitzer 08] are a relatively new class of social choice mechanisms. In this paper, we survey developments in generalized scoring rules, showing that they provide a fruitful framework to obtain general results, and also reconcile the Borda approach and Condorcet approach via a new social choice axiom. We comment on some high-level ideas behind GSRs and their connection to Machine Learning, and point out some ongoing work and future directions.