Resistance to bribery when aggregating soft constraints

  • Authors:
  • Maria Silvia Pini;Francesca Rossi;Kristen Brent Venable

  • Affiliations:
  • University of Padova, Padova, Italy;University of Padova, Padova, Italy;Tulane University and IHMC, New Orleans, LA, USA

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
  • Year:
  • 2013

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Abstract

We investigate a multi-agent scenario where agents express their preferences over a large set of decisions via soft constraints. We consider sequential procedures (based on Plurality, Approval, and Borda) to aggregate agents' preferences and we study their resistance to bribery attempts to influence the result of the aggregation.