Bribery in voting over combinatorial domains is easy

Authors:
Nicholas Mattei;Maria Silvia Pini;K. Brent Venable;Francesca Rossi
Affiliations:
University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY;University of Padova, Padova, Italy;University of Padova, Padova, Italy;University of Padova, Padova, Italy
Venue:
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 3
Year:
2012

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Abstract

We investigate the computational complexity of finding optimal bribery schemes in voting domains where the candidate set is the Cartesian product of a set of variables and agents' preferences are represented as CP-nets. We show that, in most cases, the bribery problem is easy. This also holds for some cases of k-approval, where bribery is difficult in traditional domains.