When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem
Artificial Intelligence
How hard is bribery in elections?
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Complexity of unweighted coalitional manipulation under some common voting rules
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
A scheduling approach to coalitional manipulation
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Using complexity to protect elections
Communications of the ACM
Ties matter: complexity of voting manipulation revisited
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
An algorithm for the coalitional manipulation problem under Maximin
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Coalitional voting manipulation: a game-theoretic perspective
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
On the complexity of voting manipulation under randomized tie-breaking
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
Proof systems and transformation games
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
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Social choice theory and cooperative (coalitional) game theory have become important foundations for the design and analysis of multiagent systems. In this paper, we use cooperative game theory tools in order to explore the coalition formation process in the coalitional manipulation problem. Unlike earlier work on a cooperative-game-theoretic approach to the manipulation problem [2], we consider a model where utilities are not transferable. We investigate the issue of stability in coalitional manipulation voting games; we define two notions of the core in these domains, the α -core and the β -core. For each type of core, we investigate how hard it is to determine whether a given candidate is in the core. We prove that for both types of core, this determination is at least as hard as the coalitional manipulation problem. On the other hand, we show that for some voting rules, the α - and the β -core problems are no harder than the coalitional manipulation problem. We also show that some prominent voting rules, when applied to the truthful preferences of voters, may produce an outcome not in the core, even when the core is not empty.