Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
A heuristic technique for multi-agent planning
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Evaluation of election outcomes under uncertainty
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem
Artificial Intelligence
Preference functions that score rankings and maximum likelihood estimation
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Complexity of unweighted coalitional manipulation under some common voting rules
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Equilibria of plurality voting with abstentions
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Ties matter: complexity of voting manipulation revisited
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
An NTU cooperative game theoretic view of manipulating elections
WINE'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Optimal manipulation of voting rules
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Manipulation with randomized tie-breaking under Maximin
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 3
On the hardness of finding subsets with equal average
Information Processing Letters
On manipulation in multi-winner elections based on scoring rules
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
Bribery in voting with CP-nets
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
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Computational complexity of voting manipulation is one of the most actively studied topics in the area of computational social choice, starting with the groundbreaking work of [Bartholdi et al., 1989]. Most of the existing work in this area, including that of [Bartholdi et al., 1989], implicitly assumes that whenever several candidates receive the top score with respect to the given voting rule, the resulting tie is broken according to a lexicographic ordering over the candidates. However, till recently, an equally appealing method of tie-breaking, namely, selecting the winner uniformly at random among all tied candidates, has not been considered in the computational social choice literature. The first paper to analyze the complexity of voting manipulation under randomized tiebreaking is [Obraztsova et al., 2011], where the authors provide polynomial-time algorithms for this problem under scoring rules and--under an additional assumption on the manipulator's utilities-- for Maximin. In this paper, we extend the results of [Obraztsova et al., 2011] by showing that finding an optimal vote under randomized tie-breaking is computationally hard for Copeland and Maximin (with general utilities), as well as for STV and Ranked Pairs, but easy for the Bucklin rule and Plurality with Runoff.