A heuristic technique for multi-agent planning
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Equilibria of plurality voting with abstentions
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Equilibria of plurality voting with abstentions
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Strategic sequential voting in multi-issue domains and multiple-election paradoxes
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Ties matter: complexity of voting manipulation revisited
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Costly voting with sequential participation
PRIMA'11 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Agents in Principle, Agents in Practice
Coalitional voting manipulation: a game-theoretic perspective
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
On the complexity of voting manipulation under randomized tie-breaking
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
Ties matter: complexity of voting manipulation revisited
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume Three
On coalitions and stable winners in plurality
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
On the hardness of finding subsets with equal average
Information Processing Letters
Empirical analysis of plurality election equilibria
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
The complexity of online manipulation of sequential elections
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
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In the traditional voting manipulation literature, it is assumed that a group of manipulators jointly misrepresent their preferences to get a certain candidate elected, while the remaining voters are truthful. In this paper, we depart from this assumption, and consider the setting where all voters are strategic. In this case, the election can be viewed as a game, and the election outcomes correspond to Nash equilibria of this game. We use this framework to analyze two variants of Plurality voting, namely, simultaneous voting, where all voters submit their ballots at the same time, and sequential voting, where the voters express their preferences one by one. For simultaneous voting, we characterize the preference profiles that admit a pure Nash equilibrium, but show that it is computationally hard to check if a given profile fits our criterion. For sequential voting, we provide a complete analysis of the setting with two candidates, and show that for three or more candidates the equilibria of sequential voting may behave in a counterintuitive manner.