Artificial Intelligence
The constrainedness knife-edge
AAAI '98/IAAI '98 Proceedings of the fifteenth national/tenth conference on Artificial intelligence/Innovative applications of artificial intelligence
Morphing: combining structure and randomness
AAAI '99/IAAI '99 Proceedings of the sixteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence and the eleventh Innovative applications of artificial intelligence conference innovative applications of artificial intelligence
IJCAI '99 Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Scaling Effects in the CSP Phase Transition
CP '95 Proceedings of the First International Conference on Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming
Threshold phenomena in random graph colouring and satisfiability
Threshold phenomena in random graph colouring and satisfiability
When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
On the complexity of manipulating elections
CATS '07 Proceedings of the thirteenth Australasian symposium on Theory of computing - Volume 65
Average-case tractability of manipulation in voting via the fraction of manipulators
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
A sufficient condition for voting rules to be frequently manipulable
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Generalized scoring rules and the frequency of coalitional manipulability
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Elections Can be Manipulated Often
FOCS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Nonexistence of voting rules that are usually hard to manipulate
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Junta distributions and the average-case complexity of manipulating elections
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Where the really hard problems are
IJCAI'91 Proceedings of the 12th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
IJCAI'01 Proceedings of the 17th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Where are the really hard manipulation problems? the phase transition in manipulating the veto rule
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Hard and easy distributions of SAT problems
AAAI'92 Proceedings of the tenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
Is computational complexity a barrier to manipulation?
CLIMA'10 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Computational logic in multi-agent systems
Strategy-proof voting rules over multi-issue domains with restricted preferences
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Empirical evaluation of voting rules with strictly ordered preference data
ADT'11 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Algorithmic decision theory
Bribery in path-disruption games
ADT'11 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Algorithmic decision theory
Is computational complexity a barrier to manipulation?
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Where are the hard manipulation problems?
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
An empirical study of seeding manipulations and their prevention
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Control complexity in bucklin, fallback, and plurality voting: an experimental approach
SEA'12 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Experimental Algorithms
A MAS Approach to Course Offering Determination
WI-IAT '12 Proceedings of the The 2012 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Joint Conferences on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology - Volume 03
Manipulating two stage voting rules
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
A behavioral perspective on social choice
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
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Voting is a simple mechanism to combine together the preferences of multiple agents. Agents may try to manipulate the result of voting by mis-reporting their preferences. One barrier that might exist to such manipulation is computational complexity. In particular, it has been shown that it is NP-hard to compute how to manipulate a number of different voting rules. However, NP-hardness only bounds the worst-case complexity. Recent theoretical results suggest that manipulation may often be easy in practice. In this paper, we study empirically the manipulability of single transferable voting (STV) to determine if computational complexity is really a barrier to manipulation. STV was one of the first voting rules shown to be NP-hard. It also appears one of the harder voting rules to manipulate. We sample a number of distributions of votes including uniform and real world elections. In almost every election in our experiments, it was easy to compute how a single agent could manipulate the election or to prove that manipulation by a single agent was impossible.