Winner determination in sequential majority voting

Authors:
J. Lang;M. S. Pini;F. Rossi;K. B. Venable;T. Walsh
Affiliations:
IRIT, Toulouse, France;Department of Pure and Applied Mathematics, University of Padova, Italy;Department of Pure and Applied Mathematics, University of Padova, Italy;Department of Pure and Applied Mathematics, University of Padova, Italy;NICTA and UNSW Sydney, Australia
Venue:
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Year:
2007

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Abstract

Preferences can be aggregated using voting rules. We consider here the family of rules which perform a sequence of pairwise majority comparisons between two candidates. The winner thus depends on the chosen sequence of comparisons, which can be represented by a binary tree. We address the difficulty of computing candidates that win for some trees, and then introduce and study the notion of fair winner, i.e. candidates who win in a balanced tree. We then consider the situation where we lack complete informations about preferences, and determine the computational complexity of computing winners in this case.