Manipulating stochastically generated single-elimination tournaments for nearly all players

  • Authors:
  • Isabelle Stanton;Virginia Vassilevska Williams

  • Affiliations:
  • Computer Science Department, UC Berkeley;Computer Science Department, UC Berkeley

  • Venue:
  • WINE'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
  • Year:
  • 2011

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Abstract

We study the power of a tournament organizer in manipulating the outcome of a balanced single-elimination tournament by fixing the initial seeding. This problem is known as agenda control for balanced voting trees . It is not known whether there is a polynomial time algorithm that computes a seeding for which a given player can win the tournament, even if the match outcomes for all pairwise player match-ups are known in advance. We approach the problem by giving a sufficient condition under which the organizer can always efficiently find a tournament seeding for which the given player will win the tournament. We then use this result to show that for most match outcomes generated by a natural random model attributed to Condorcet, the tournament organizer can very efficiently make a large constant fraction of the players win, by manipulating the initial seeding.