Introduction to Multiagent Systems
Introduction to Multiagent Systems
Vote manipulation in the presence of multiple sincere ballots
TARK '07 Proceedings of the 11th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Incompleteness and incomparability in preference aggregation
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Applications of logic in social choice theory
CLIMA'11 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Computational logic in multi-agent systems
Aggregating dependency graphs into voting agendas in multi-issue elections
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
Campaigns for lazy voters: truncated ballots
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
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Voting theory can provide useful insights for multiagent preference aggregation. However, the standard setting assumes voters with preferences that are total orders, as well as a ballot language that coincides with the preference language. In typical AI scenarios, these assumptions do not hold: certain alternatives may be incomparable for some agents, and others may have their preferences encoded in a format that is different from how the preference aggregation mechanism wants them. We study the consequences of dropping these assumptions. In particular, we investigate the consequences for the important notion of strategy-proofness. While strategy-proofness cannot be guaranteed in the classical setting, we are able to show that there are situations in our more general framework where this is possible. We also consider computational aspects of the problem.