Aggregating partially ordered preferences: impossibility and possibility results
TARK '05 Proceedings of the 10th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
A Short Introduction to Computational Social Choice
SOFSEM '07 Proceedings of the 33rd conference on Current Trends in Theory and Practice of Computer Science
Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Aggregating value ranges: preference elicitation and truthfulness
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
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Preferences of a single agent are often partially ordered. For example, it may be hard to compare a novel with a biography. In such a situation, the agent may want the novel and the biography to be considered incomparable. We consider here how to aggregate the partially ordered preferences of multiple agents in order to return a set of most preferred outcomes. We define the notion of strategy-proofness for such a scenario. This is when preference aggregation cannot be manipulated. We prove that if there is no dictator, agents can manipulate the result by voting strategically to determine the most preferred outcomes. This extends the well-known theorem by Gibbard and Satterthwaite for total orders.