Preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
Vote elicitation: complexity and strategy-proofness
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
On polynomial-time preference elicitation with value queries
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Applying learning algorithms to preference elicitation
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Preference Elicitation and Query Learning
The Journal of Machine Learning Research
Communication complexity of common voting rules
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Complexity of terminating preference elicitation
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Single-peaked consistency and its complexity
Proceedings of the 2008 conference on ECAI 2008: 18th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Uncertainty in preference elicitation and aggregation
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Eliciting single-peaked preferences using comparison queries
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Where are the hard manipulation problems?
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
AT'13 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Agreement Technologies
From blurry numbers to clear preferences: A mechanism to extract reputation in social networks
Expert Systems with Applications: An International Journal
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Voting is a general method for aggregating the preferences of multiple agents. Each agent ranks all the possible alternatives, and based on this, an aggregate ranking of the alternatives (or at least a winning alternative) is produced. However, when there are many alternatives, it is impractical to simply ask agents to report their complete preferences. Rather, the agents' preferences, or at least the relevant parts thereof, need to be elicited. This is done by asking the agents a (hopefully small) number of simple queries about their preferences, such as comparison queries, which ask an agent to compare two of the alternatives. Prior work on preference elicitation in voting has focused on the case of unrestricted preferences. It has been shown that in this setting, it is sometimes necessary to ask each agent (almost) as many queries as would be required to determine an arbitrary ranking of the alternatives. By contrast, in this paper, we focus on single-peaked preferences. We show that such preferences can be elicited using only a linear number of comparison queries, if either the order with respect to which preferences are single-peaked is known, or at least one other agent's complete preferences are known. We also show that using a sublinear number of queries will not suffice. Finally, we present experimental results.