Integer and combinatorial optimization
Integer and combinatorial optimization
Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions
Management Science
iBundle: an efficient ascending price bundle auction
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Optimal solutions for multi-unit combinatorial auctions: branch and bound heuristics
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
AkBA: a progressive, anonymous-price combinatorial auction
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
An Algorithm for Optimal Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions
IJCAI '99 Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Incentive compatible multi unit combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 9th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Towards a Characterization of Truthful Combinatorial Auctions
FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
CABOB: a fast optimal algorithm for combinatorial auctions
IJCAI'01 Proceedings of the 17th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Complexity of mechanism design
UAI'02 Proceedings of the Eighteenth conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence
Welfare maximization in congestion games
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Charity auctions on social networks
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Charitable technologies: opportunities for collaborative computing in nonprofit fundraising
Proceedings of the 2008 ACM conference on Computer supported cooperative work
Expressive negotiation in settings with externalities
AAAI'05 Proceedings of the 20th national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Computational aspects of mechanism design
AAAI'05 Proceedings of the 20th national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 4
Making decisions based on the preferences of multiple agents
Communications of the ACM
Computing optimal outcomes under an expressive representation of settings with externalities
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
Finding social optima in congestion games with positive externalities
ESA'12 Proceedings of the 20th Annual European conference on Algorithms
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When donating money to a (say, charitable) cause, it is possible touse the contemplated donation as negotiating material to induce other parties interested in the charity to donate more. Such negotiation is usually done in terms of matching offers, where one party promises to pay a certain amount if others pay a certain amount. However, in their current form, matching offers allow for only limited negotiation. For one, it is not immediately clear how multiple parties can make matching offers at the same time without creating circular dependencies. Also, it is not immediately clear how to make adonation conditional on other donations to multiple charities, when the donator has different levels of appreciation for the different charities. In both these cases, the limited expressiveness of matching offers causes economic loss: it may happen that an arrangement that would have made all parties (donators as well as charities) better off cannot be expressed in terms of matching offers and will therefore notoccur.In this paper, we introduce a bidding language for expressing very general types of matching offers over multiple charities. We formulate the corresponding clearing problem (deciding how much each bidder pays, and how much each charity receives), and show that it is NP-complete to approximate to any ratio even in very restricted settings. We givea mixed-integer program formulation of the clearing problem, and show that for concave bids, the program reduces to a linear program. We then show that the clearing problem for a subclass of concave bids is at least as hard as the decision variant of linear programming. Subsequently, we show that the clearing problem is much easier when bids are quasilinear---for surplus, the problem decomposes across charities, and for payment maximization, a greedy approach isoptimal if the bids are concave (although this latter problem is weakly NP-complete when the bids are not concave). For the quasilinear setting, we study the mechanism design question. We show that anex-post efficient mechanism is impossible even with only one charity and a very restricted class of bids. We also show that there may bebenefits to linking the charities from a mechanism design stand point.