Expressive negotiation over donations to charities
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Making decisions based on the preferences of multiple agents
Communications of the ACM
Models of Charity Donations and Project Funding in Social Networks
OTM '09 Proceedings of the Confederated International Workshops and Posters on On the Move to Meaningful Internet Systems: ADI, CAMS, EI2N, ISDE, IWSSA, MONET, OnToContent, ODIS, ORM, OTM Academy, SWWS, SEMELS, Beyond SAWSDL, and COMBEK 2009
Computing optimal outcomes under an expressive representation of settings with externalities
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
Crowdfunding inside the enterprise: employee-initiatives for innovation and collaboration
Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems
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Charitable giving is influenced by many social, psychological, and economic factors. One common way to encourage individuals to donate to charities is by offering to match their contribution (often by their employer or by the government). Conitzer and Sandholm introduced the idea of using auctions to allow individuals to offer to match the contribution of others. We explore this idea in a social network setting, where individuals care about the contribution of their neighbors, and are allowed to specify contributions that are conditional on the contribution of their neighbors. We give a mechanism for this setting that raises the largest individually rational contributions given the conditional bids, and analyze the equilibria of this mechanism in the case of linear utilities. We show that if the social network is strongly connected, the mechanism always has an equilibrium that raises the maximum total contribution (which is the contribution computed according to the true utilities); in other words, the price of stability of the game defined by this mechanism is one. Interestingly, although the mechanism is not dominant strategy truthful (and in fact, truthful reporting need not even be a Nash equilibrium of this game), this result shows that the mechanism always has a full-information equilibrium which achieves the same outcome as in the truthful scenario. Of course, there exist cases where the maximum total contribution even with true utilities is zero: we show that the existence of non-zero equilibria can be characterized exactly in terms of the largest eigenvalue of the utility matrix associated with the social network.