Computational criticisms of the revelation principle
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Complexity of mechanism design
UAI'02 Proceedings of the Eighteenth conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence
Mechanism design with partial verification and revelation principle
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Mechanism design: from partial to probabilistic verification
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
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The central question in mechanism design is how to implement a given social choice function. One of the most studied concepts is that of truthful implementations in which truth-telling is always the best response of the players. The Revelation Principle says that one can focus on truthful implementations without loss of generality (if there is no truthful implementation then there is no implementation at all). Green and Laffont (Rev Econ Stud 53:447---456, 1986) showed that, in the scenario in which players' responses can be partially verified, the revelation principle holds only in some particular cases. When the Revelation Principle does not hold, non-truthful implementations become interesting since they might be the only way to implement a social choice function of interest. In this work we show that, although non-truthful implementations may exist, they are hard to find. Namely, it is NP-complete to decide if a given social choice function can be implemented in a non-truthful manner, or even if it can be implemented at all. This is in contrast to the fact that truthful implementability can be efficiently recognized, even when partial verification of the agents is allowed. Our results also show that there is no "simple" characterization of those social choice functions for which it is worth looking for non-truthful implementations.