Approximate mechanism design without money
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Achieving budget-balance with Vickrey-based payment schemes in exchanges
IJCAI'01 Proceedings of the 17th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Finding approximate competitive equilibria: efficient and fair course allocation
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Strategy-proof allocation of multiple items between two agents without payments or priors
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Combinatorial markets in theory and practice: mitigating incentives and facilitating elicitation
Combinatorial markets in theory and practice: mitigating incentives and facilitating elicitation
Payment rules through discriminant-based classifiers
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
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In a typical mechanism design paper the goal is to find a mechanism that maximizes the designer's objective (e.g., social welfare) subject to technology and incentive constraints. In a typical applied matching paper, by contrast, the goal is to find a mechanism that satisfies various "good properties" (e.g., efficiency and fairness). This essay discusses the relationship and tradeoffs between these two approaches. An introductory example, school choice, represents a simple win for the good properties approach. The main example, course allocation, paints a more complicated picture.