Strategic deliberation and truthful revelation: an impossibility result
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Reducing costly information acquisition in auctions
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Algorithmic pricing via virtual valuations
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Efficient metadeliberation auctions
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
The power of randomness in bayesian optimal mechanism design
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
STOC '12 Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
A prevalent assumption in traditional mechanism design is that buyers know their precise value for an item; however, this assumption is rarely true in practice. In most settings, buyers can "deliberate", i.e., spend money or time, in order improve their estimate of an item's value. It is known that the deliberative setting is fundamentally different than the classical one, and desirable properties of a mechanism such as equilibria, revenue maximization, or truthfulness, may no longer hold. In this paper we introduce a new general deliberative model in which users have independent private values that are a-priori unknown, but can be learned. We consider the design of dominant-strategy revenue-optimal auctions in this setting. Surprisingly, for a wide class of environments, we show the optimal revenue is attained with a sequential posted price mechanism (SPP). While this result is not constructive, we show how to construct approximately optimal SPPs in polynomial time. We also consider the design of Bayes-Nash incentive compatible auctions for a simple deliberative model.