Do the right thing: studies in limited rationality
Do the right thing: studies in limited rationality
Deliberation scheduling for problem solving in time-constrained environments
Artificial Intelligence
Artificial Intelligence - Special issue on economic principles of multi-agent systems
Monitoring and control of anytime algorithms: a dynamic programming approach
Artificial Intelligence - special issue on computational tradeoffs under bounded resources
Amplification of Search Performance through Randomization of Heuristics
CP '02 Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming
Strategic deliberation and truthful revelation: an impossibility result
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Costly valuation computation in auctions
TARK '01 Proceedings of the 8th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Issues in computational Vickrey auctions
International Journal of Electronic Commerce - Special issue: Intelligent agents for electronic commerce
Heuristic-biased stochastic sampling
AAAI'96 Proceedings of the thirteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Auction design with costly preference elicitation
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Mechanism design and deliberative agents
Proceedings of the fourth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Valuation uncertainty and imperfect introspection in second-price auctions
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
Auctions are useful mechanisms for allocating items (goods, tasks, resources, etc.) in multiagent systems. The bulk of auction theory assumes that the bidders know their own valuations for items a priori. However, in many applications the bidders need to expend significant effort (computational or information gathering) to determine their valuations. This leads to the possibility of complex strategic behavior as agents may have incentive to not only use resources to determine their own valuations, but may also attempt to determine the valuations of competing bidders. It has been shown that given any commonly used auction protocol, it is theoretically possible to construct special instances such that this strategic deliberation occurs.We study the prevalence of strategic deliberating in order to determine whether it is merely of theoretical interest or if it is an issue which arises in practice. Using anytime algorithms and performance-profile-tree-based deliberation control in different real-world problem domains, and the deliberation equilibrium solution concept, we show that strategic deliberation does occur in practice whenever there is a certain amount of asymmetry between the agents.