Issues in computational Vickrey auctions
International Journal of Electronic Commerce - Special issue: Intelligent agents for electronic commerce
Fault tolerant mechanism design
Artificial Intelligence
Randomization vs. Selection: How to Choose in the Absence of Preference?
Management Science
Mechanism design with uncertain inputs: (to err is human, to forgive divine)
Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
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We study single-good auctions when each player knows his own valuation only within a constant multiplicative factor δ ε (0, 1), known to the mechanism designer. The classical notions of implementation in dominant strategies and implementation in undominated strategies are naturally extended to this setting, but their power is vastly different. On the negative side, we prove that no dominant-strategy mechanism can guarantee social welfare that is significantly better than that achievable by assigning the good to a random player. On the positive side, we provide tight upper and lower bounds for the fraction of the maximum social welfare achievable in undominated strategies, whether deterministically or probabilistically.