REACT: Rapid Enhanced-Security Asymmetric Cryptosystem Transform
CT-RSA 2001 Proceedings of the 2001 Conference on Topics in Cryptology: The Cryptographer's Track at RSA
Identity-Based Encryption from the Weil Pairing
CRYPTO '01 Proceedings of the 21st Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge and Chosen Ciphertext Attack
CRYPTO '91 Proceedings of the 11th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Relations Among Notions of Security for Public-Key Encryption Schemes
CRYPTO '98 Proceedings of the 18th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Secure Integration of Asymmetric and Symmetric Encryption Schemes
CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
An Efficient System for Non-transferable Anonymous Credentials with Optional Anonymity Revocation
EUROCRYPT '01 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
Key-Privacy in Public-Key Encryption
ASIACRYPT '01 Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Civitas: Toward a Secure Voting System
SP '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
An Efficient Deniable Key Exchange Protocol (Extended Abstract)
Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Information Sciences: an International Journal
Information Sciences: an International Journal
Certificateless Threshold Ring Signature
Information Sciences: an International Journal
Securing traceability of ciphertexts: towards a secure software key escrow system
EUROCRYPT'95 Proceedings of the 14th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Invisibility and anonymity of undeniable and confirmer signatures
CT-RSA'03 Proceedings of the 2003 RSA conference on The cryptographers' track
Anonymity on Paillier's trap-door permutation
ACISP'07 Proceedings of the 12th Australasian conference on Information security and privacy
Efficient privacy-preserving protocols for multi-unit auctions
FC'05 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
The sampling twice technique for the RSA-Based cryptosystems with anonymity
PKC'05 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Theory and Practice in Public Key Cryptography
PA in the two-key setting and a generic conversion for encryption with anonymity
ACISP'06 Proceedings of the 11th Australasian conference on Information Security and Privacy
An efficient incomparable public key encryption scheme
Information Sciences: an International Journal
Keyed hash function based on a dynamic lookup table of functions
Information Sciences: an International Journal
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In modern cryptosystem, Anonymity means that in some sense any adversary cannot tell which one of public keys has been used for encrypting a plaintext, and was first formally defined as the indistinguishability of keys by Bellare et al. in 2001. Recently, several well-known techniques have been proposed in order to achieve the anonymity of public-key encryption schemes. In this paper, anonymity is considered first from a new perspective. And then basing on this new perspective, a one-time encryption-key technique is proposed to achieve the anonymity of traditional discrete-logarithm-based (DL-based) encryption scheme. In this new technique, for each encryption, a random one-time encryption-key will be generated to encrypt the plaintext, instead of the original public-key. Consequently, in roughly speaking, by the randomness of the generated one-time encryption-key, this new technique should achieve the anonymity. Furthermore, in the formal proof of anonymity, only based on several weaker conditions, the one-time encryption-key technique efficiently achieves the provable indistinguishability of keys under chosen ciphertext attack (IK-CCA anonymity). As a result, compared with the work of Hayashi and Tanaka in 2006, the one-time encryption-key technique presented here has fewer requirements for achieving the provable anonymity.