Certificateless Threshold Ring Signature

  • Authors:
  • Shuang Chang;Duncan S. Wong;Yi Mu;Zhenfeng Zhang

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Computer Science, City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China;Department of Computer Science, City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China and State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100080, ...;Centre for Computer Science and Software Engineering, University of Wollongong, Wollongong 2522, Australia;State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100080, China

  • Venue:
  • Information Sciences: an International Journal
  • Year:
  • 2009

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Abstract

We propose a t-out-of-n Certificateless Threshold Ring Signature (CL-TRS) scheme and prove its security under a new and stronger set of security models. The models capture a new adversarial capability called User Partial Key Replacement Attack, which has been considered practical and realistic but has never been formalized before. The new scheme requires only a constant number of bilinear pairing operations for signature verification. It also has a compact signature size which is linear to the number of non-signers (i.e. n-t) rather than that of actual signers. We also propose a 1-out-of-n CL-TRS (i.e. a certificateless ring signature scheme) which has the most efficient verification among all the certificateless ring signature schemes currently known.