Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge and Chosen Ciphertext Attack

  • Authors:
  • Charles Rackoff;Daniel R. Simon

  • Affiliations:
  • -;-

  • Venue:
  • CRYPTO '91 Proceedings of the 11th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
  • Year:
  • 1991

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Abstract

The zero-knowledge proof of knowledge, first denned by Fiat, Fiege and Shamir, was used by Galil, Haber and Yung as a means of constructing (out of a trapdoor function) an interactive public-key cryptosystem provably secure against chosen ciphertext attack. We introduce a revised setting which permits the definition of a non-interactive analogue, the non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge, and show how it may be constructed in that setting from a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system for NP (of the type introduced by Blum, Feldman and Micali). We give a formalization of chosen ciphertext attack in our model which is stronger than the "lunchtime attack" considered by Naor and Yung, and prove a non-interactive public-key cryptosystem based on non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge to be secure against it.