The Kurosawa--Desmedt key encapsulation is not chosen-ciphertext secure

  • Authors:
  • Seung Geol Choi;Javier Herranz;Dennis Hofheinz;Jung Yeon Hwang;Eike Kiltz;Dong Hoon Lee;Moti Yung

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Computer Science, Columbia University, 450 Computer Science Bldg., New York, USA;Dept. Matemàtica Aplicada IV, UPC, Barcelona, Spain;CWI, Amsterdam, The Netherlands;Graduate School of Information Management and Security, Korea University, Seoul, Republic of Korea;CWI, Amsterdam, The Netherlands;Graduate School of Information Management and Security, Korea University, Seoul, Republic of Korea;Department of Computer Science, Columbia University, 450 Computer Science Bldg., New York, USA and Google Inc., 76 Ninth Avenue, New York, NY 10011, USA

  • Venue:
  • Information Processing Letters
  • Year:
  • 2009

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Abstract

At CRYPTO 2004, Kurosawa and Desmedt presented a new hybrid encryption scheme that is chosen-ciphertext (CCA2) secure in the standard model. Until now it was unknown if the key encapsulation part of the Kurosawa-Desmedt scheme by itself is still CCA2-secure or not. In this note we answer this question to the negative, namely we present a simple CCA2 attack on the Kurosawa-Desmedt key encapsulation mechanism. Our attack further supports the design paradigm of Kurosawa and Desmedt to build CCA2-secure hybrid encryption from weak key encapsulation.