Use of elliptic curves in cryptography
Lecture notes in computer sciences; 218 on Advances in cryptology---CRYPTO 85
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
An optimally robust hybrid mix network
Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
The Oracle Diffie-Hellman Assumptions and an Analysis of DHIES
CT-RSA 2001 Proceedings of the 2001 Conference on Topics in Cryptology: The Cryptographer's Track at RSA
Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge and Chosen Ciphertext Attack
CRYPTO '91 Proceedings of the 11th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
A Concrete Security Treatment of Symmetric Encryption
FOCS '97 Proceedings of the 38th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Design of Self-Healing Key Distribution Schemes
Designs, Codes and Cryptography
A unified model for unconditionally secure key distribution
Journal of Computer Security
An efficient broadcast encryption scheme for wireless sensor network
WiCOM'09 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Wireless communications, networking and mobile computing
Fully distributed broadcast encryption
ProvSec'11 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Provable security
A new ID-based broadcast encryption scheme
ATC'06 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Autonomic and Trusted Computing
One-Way chain based broadcast encryption schemes
EUROCRYPT'05 Proceedings of the 24th annual international conference on Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
Efficient broadcast encryption using multiple interpolation methods
ICISC'04 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Information Security and Cryptology
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Mix chains as proposed by Chaum allow sendingun traceable electronic e-mail without requiring trust in a single authority: messages are recursively public-key encrypted to multiple intermediates (mixes), each of which forwards the message after removing one layer of encryption. To conceal as much information as possible when using variable (source routed) chains, all messages passed to mixes should be of the same length; thus, message length should not decrease when a mix transforms an input message into the corresponding output message directed at the next mix in the chain. Chaum described an implementation for such length-preserving mixes, but it is not secure against active attacks. We show how to build practical cryptographically secure length-preserving mixes. The conventional definition of security against chosen ciphertext attacks is not applicable to length-preserving mixes; we give an appropriate definition and show that our construction achieves provable security.