Communicating sequential processes
Communicating sequential processes
A digital signature scheme secure against adaptive chosen-message attacks
SIAM Journal on Computing - Special issue on cryptography
Algebraic theory of processes
STOC '98 Proceedings of the thirtieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Timestamps in key distribution protocols
Communications of the ACM
Using encryption for authentication in large networks of computers
Communications of the ACM
Communication and Concurrency
A Calculus of Communicating Systems
A Calculus of Communicating Systems
Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge and Chosen Ciphertext Attack
CRYPTO '91 Proceedings of the 11th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Brutus: a model checker for security protocols
Brutus: a model checker for security protocols
On the security of public key protocols
SFCS '81 Proceedings of the 22nd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
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In the areas of computer security and cryptographic protocols a standard model for describing the malicious behaviour of adversaries is the Dolev-Yao threat model. In formal analysis of complex, reactive and concurrent communication systems, a well-researched algebraic process approach is Milner's Calculus of Communicating Systems (CCS) which has the semantic foundation underpinned by Plotkin's structured operational semantics (SOS). In this article we provide a CCS-SOS modelling of the Dolev-Yao threat environment and its composition with the CCS description of a cryptographic protocol. For a given protocol, we attempt to discover security flaws by examining whether there is any difference between the SOS transition behaviours of the protocol descriptions which has and has not been composed with the malicious environment. The intuitively appealing modelling shows a suitability for the well-researched CCS-SOS-based algebraic process approach being applied to formal analysis of cryptographic protocols.