A digital signature scheme secure against adaptive chosen-message attacks
SIAM Journal on Computing - Special issue on cryptography
A probabilistic poly-time framework for protocol analysis
CCS '98 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A calculus for cryptographic protocols
Information and Computation
Authentication primitives and their compilation
Proceedings of the 27th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Secure implementation of channel abstractions
Information and Computation
Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge and Chosen Ciphertext Attack
CRYPTO '91 Proceedings of the 11th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Analysis of Key-Exchange Protocols and Their Use for Building Secure Channels
EUROCRYPT '01 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
A composable cryptographic library with nested operations
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Symmetric Encryption in a Simulatable Dolev-Yao Style Cryptographic Library
CSFW '04 Proceedings of the 17th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Theoretical Computer Science - Special issue: Foundations of wide area network computing
Automated Verification of Selected Equivalences for Security Protocols
LICS '05 Proceedings of the 20th Annual IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science
Secrecy types for a simulatable cryptographic library
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A probabilistic polynomial-time process calculus for the analysis of cryptographic protocols
Theoretical Computer Science
Reconciling Two Views of Cryptography (The Computational Soundness of Formal Encryption)
Journal of Cryptology
Preservation of epistemic properties in security protocol implementations
TARK '07 Proceedings of the 11th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Cryptographically sound implementations for typed information-flow security
Proceedings of the 35th annual ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
A secure compiler for session abstractions
Journal of Computer Security - 20th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)
Computational soundness of observational equivalence
Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Threshold Homomorphic Encryption in the Universally Composable Cryptographic Library
ProvSec '08 Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Provable Security
Security Abstractions and Intruder Models (Extended Abstract)
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
CoSP: a general framework for computational soundness proofs
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Computationally sound verification of source code
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Computational soundness of symbolic zero-knowledge proofs
Journal of Computer Security - 7th International Workshop on Issues in the Theory of Security (WITS'07)
Secrecy and authenticity types for secure distributed messaging
ARSPA-WITS'10 Proceedings of the 2010 joint conference on Automated reasoning for security protocol analysis and issues in the theory of security
AnBx: security protocols design and verification
ARSPA-WITS'10 Proceedings of the 2010 joint conference on Automated reasoning for security protocol analysis and issues in the theory of security
A Survey of Symbolic Methods in Computational Analysis of Cryptographic Systems
Journal of Automated Reasoning
Automating information flow control in component-based distributed systems
Proceedings of the 14th international ACM Sigsoft symposium on Component based software engineering
Computational secrecy by typing for the pi calculus
APLAS'06 Proceedings of the 4th Asian conference on Programming Languages and Systems
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We design a core language of principals running distributed programs over a public network. Our language is a variant of the pi calculus, with secure communications, mobile names, and high-level certificates, but without any explicit cryptography. Within this language, security properties can be conveniently studied using trace properties and observational equivalences, even in the presence of an arbitrary (abstract) adversary With some care, these security properties can be achieved in a concrete setting, relying on standard cryptographic primitives and computational assumptions, even in the presence of an adversary modeled as an arbitrary probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm. To this end, we develop a cryptographic implementation that preserves all properties for all safe programs. We give a series of soundness and completeness results that precisely relate the language to its implementation